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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

l

Plaintiff-Respondent, t
i
XT

Case No. 880579-CA

i

i

V •

ROBERT RAY HULSE,

li

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant, i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal arises from defendant's conviction for
Theft, a third degree felony, in the Third Judicial District
Court.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) (Supp.
1988) which permits criminal appeals from the district court for
crimes other than capital and first degree felonies.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence produced at trial regarding

the identity and value of the stolen property was sufficient to
allow reasonable jurors to find defendant guilty of third degree
felony theft.
2.

Whether the trial court acted within its discretion

in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
3.

Whether the value of the watches taken supports a

conviction for third degree felony theft.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSg STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the
following provisions:
Utah Code A m u S 76-6-404 (1978)
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412 (1978)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 25, 1988, defendant was charged with theft, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1978), for an incident which occurred on May 20, 1988 (Record
[hereinafter R.] at 13-14).

A jury trial was held on July 28,

1988, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.' After trial, the jury
found defendant guilty as charged (R. at 65).
Defendant's motion for a new trial followed on
September 20, 1988 (R. at 69-70), and received consideration at
the time of the sentencing hearing on September 23, 1988 (R. at
88; Transcript of Proceeding [hereinafter T.] at 133-134).

After

considering the matter, Judge Sawaya dismissed defendant's motion
(R. at 134), and sentenced him to serve a term in the Utah State
Prison, not to exceed five years (R. at 72),
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 20, 1988, defendant entered a jewelry store,
(known as The Time Shop Jewelers,) located at 15 West South
Temple in downtown Salt Lake City (T. at 48-49).

Jeff Hansen, a

store salesman, greeted defendant and asked if he would like to
see the watch that defendant had shown interest in when he
visited the store the day before (T. at 45, 49). Defendant

responded "yes" and asked to look at another watch at the same
time.

Mr. Hansen removed the watches from the showcase and

placed them on top of the case for defendant's perusal.

In a

customary fashion, defendant took a man's black analog digital
Seiko watch and tried it on.

He then grabbed the second watch, a

gold Seiko, and bolted at full speed for and out the store door
(T. at 51/ 63). Mr. Hansen, seeing defendant fleeing with the
two items of store property, quickly jumped over the counter and
ran out the door in pursuit of defendant (T. at 52).
Defendant leaped into his waiting car on the driver's
side and prepared to drive off, but Hansen dove through the open
passenger side window and grabbed him (T. at 52, 75). John
Logsdon, another salesman, saw defendant's dash for the door and
the subsequent pursuit by Mr. Hansen and quickly followed the two
out the store door and also leaned through the open car passenger
window (T. at 75-76).

A struggle involving the three men

commenced and then ended when the car was driven into a concrete
pillar (T. at 53, 66, 76).
The salesmen and two bystanders physically restrained
defendant through his repeated attempts to flee the scene until
the arrival of the police which happened shortly thereafter (T.
at 55). Lieutenant Norm Thompson of the Salt Lake City Police
Department arrived at the scene and took the black analog digital
Seiko watch from defendant's wrist.

This watch, valued at $220-

$275, still had the store's tag attached (T. at 51, 90, 95-96).
Lieutenant Thompson testified to taking the black watch from the
wrist of the defendant and placing it in the custody of Detective

Bruce Smith.

Detective Smith testified to placing the watch into

evidence on May 20 and retrieving it from the evidence room on
the day of the trial prior to turning it over to the prosecutor
for presentation at trial (T. at 99-100).
The second watch, a gold Seiko valued at $185-$225 and
damaged in the fracas, was picked up by John Logsdon from inside
the defendant's car after the crash, and subsequently placed on
top of the store's safe where it remained until the time of trial
(T. at 51, 77, 90, 95-96).

The gold watch came into evidence

without objection from defendant (T. at 80).
After the guilty verdict had been entered, but before
sentencing, defendant made a motion for a new trial based on an
affidavit of an alleged witness to defendant's arrest (T. at
133).

The newly found witness allegedly would testify that "he

had witnessed the watch—the two watches being recovered from the
street near the vehicle rather than . . . one from his
[defendant's] wrist and one from the floor of the car" (T. at
133).

The motion was denied (T. at 134).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant fails to establish that the evidence in this

case is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable minds could
not have found the him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

testimony of the witness to the taking of the watches was
sufficient to establish defendant's guilt even if the watches had
not been retrieved and introduced at trial.
The issue of whether the watches introduced into
evidence were the same watches retrieved from defendant and his

car depends to a certain extent on the chain of custody for the
watches after they were seized from defendant.

A proper chain of

custody was established for the black watch at trial and has a
presumption of regularity under Utah law.

Defendant did not

rebut that presumption by presenting evidence, or even a claim,
that the exhibits had been subject to bad faith, altering, or
tampering.

Defendant did not challenge the introduction of the

gold watch at trial so cannot now object to its admission.
Defendant also fails to establish grounds sufficient to
grant a new trial.

The trial court is allowed great deference in

making determinations regarding the granting of new trials based
on a contention of "new evidence."

Defendant's claim to new

evidence lacks the substance and credibility which would be
necessary to justify this Court's overturning the trial court's
finding that the "new evidence" would probably not have changed
the verdict.
The State adequately proved its case to allow a jury to
find the defendant guilty of stealing two watches valued at
between $250 and $1,000 to classify the theft as a third degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE UPHELD
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Defendant correctly points out that the standard of
review for an insufficiency of the evidence claim is well
established.

A verdict will be overturned only when the evidence

is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable persons could not
have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v.

Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1987), quoting State v.
Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted); see
also State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), superseded by
statute/rule in the context of bench trials, as stated in State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d
1029 (Utah App. 1987).
The burden of establishing that "the evidence was so
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime charged" rests upon the defendant.
P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).

State v. Kerekes, 622

In the instant case, defendant

fails to carry this burden.
A. THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY FROM HANSEN
THAT DEFENDANT TOOK THE WATCHES FROM THE STORE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT WHETHER
THE WATCHES INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WERE THE SAME
WATCHES TAKEN BY DEFENDANT OR NOT.
Defendant's main contention on appeal is that the
evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to prove that the
watches introduced as exhibits were the watches taken by
defendant from the jewelry store. The State maintains first that
that question is immaterial based on the overwhelming evidence
that defendant committed the theft.

Defendant was seen by Hansen

putting the black watch on his wrist then grabbing the gold watch
and running from the store (T. at 51-52, 61). Even had defendant
been able to dispose of the watches and they had never been
recovered for introduction at trial, the testimony of Hansen was

sufficient to support the jury's conviction of defendant.

That

the watches were recovered and in the manner and location that
they were, only bolstered Hansen's testimony.
B. BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF RETRIEVAL, CHAIN OF
CUSTODY, AND IDENTIFICATION BY APPEARANCE OF THE
WATCHES, THEIR ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE WAS PROPER.
Defendant argues that the watches introduced into
evidence were not conclusively proven to be the same watches he
took from the store and, without that conclusiveness, the State
did not prove its case that defendant stole the watches. As
noted above in Point I A, the evidence of defendant's asportation
was conclusively proven even had the watches not been recovered.
Their introduction into evidence was proper because the issues
raised by defendant as to their identification go to the weight
to be given the exhibits, not their admissibility.
Defendant, on appeal, focuses on whether the black
analog digital Seiko watch entered as evidence at trial was the
same watch stolen from The Time Shop Jewelers and recovered from
defendant's wrist, and not whether defendant had in fact taken a
black analog digital watch from the shop (Brief of defendant at
7-9).

At trial, the State introduced abundant testimony to

support the inference that the watch taken from The Time Shop and
recovered from defendant's wrist was the same watch stolen by
defendant and the same watch admitted at trial.

Jeff Hansen,

when asked to identify Exhibit 1, testified, "this is the watch
that he [defendant] asked to look atM on May 19, and the same
watch Mr. Hansen showed to defendant the following day and which
defendant took from the store. (T. at 45, 48-49).

The store

owner, Mr. Howard Logsdon, testified that he had had in stock a
watch identical to Exhibit 1 before the theft, but did not have
it immediately after the theft, and believed Exhibit 1 was the
missing watch (T. at 91). Lieutenant Norm Thompson testified
that Exhibit 1 appeared to be the watch he took from the
defendant's wrist after the theft, and which he gave to Detective
Smith to be placed in the police evidence locker (T. at 95).
Detective Bruce Smith testified that he had placed the watch in
an evidence envelope and that the envelope containing Exhibit 1
was the same envelope (T. at 99).
Defendant's appeal thus addresses a chain of custody
issue regarding the black Seiko watch.

In Utah law, a

presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by police
and other public officials exists. An exhibit will be excluded
only if affirmative evidence exists and is presented to establish
bad faith, or actual tampering or altering of the evidence in the
chain of custody.

State v. Eagle Bookf Inc., 583 P.2d 73, 75

(Utah 1978), citing United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1306
(9th Cir. 1977); see also State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah
App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
weaknesses

Any gaps or

in the chain of custody go to the weight given the

evidence by the trier of fact and not to the admissibility of the
exhibits.

Eagle Book 583 P.2d at 75.
Defendant does not allege bad faith, tampering with or

altering of the evidence which was in police custody.

He appears

to be arguing that the Court must assume that the watch placed
into evidence by the police officers was not the same watch as

the one introduced at trial because no one testified as to
comparing serial numbers and thus could not say that the numbers
showed that it was the same watch.

That argument flies in the

face of the traditional chain of custody law and should be
rejected.

The officers established that the watch introduced at

trial was in their custody from the time it was taken from
defendant's wrist until it was delivered to the prosecutor at
trial.

Unless defendant presented evidence to rebut the

presumption of regularity in the police custody of the exhibit,
the jury was entitled to infer that Exhibit 1 was the watch taken
from defendant's person.
As to the gold watch which defendant seized and carried
from the store and which John Logsdon retrieved from the floor of
defendant's car after defendant's capture, no objection was made
to its introduction at trial.

Defendant is now precluded from

objecting to the admission of Exhibit 5, the gold watch, because
he has failed to preserve the issue for appeal.
Rules of Evidence.

Rule 103(a) Utah

Even if the issue had been preserved, again

the question is the weight to be given the evidence, not its
admissibility.

The testimony at trial was that defendant picked

up the gold watch (Exhibit 5) and ran out of the store and into
his car.

Mr. Hansen was in hot pursuit with Mr. John Logsdon

close behind.

After the brief scuffle in the car, which

concluded with the detention and arrest of defendant, John
Logsdon found the gold watch on the floor of defendant's
automobile and put it in his pocket (T. at 77). The watch, at
that point, had been dented and scratched and the crystal broken

(T. at 50). John Logsdon recalled that the watch was in his
pocket two-and-a-half hours later and took it from his pocket,
placed it on top of the store safe then took it to the trial (T.
at 77-78).

Both watches still had the store's stickers on them.

(T. at 77 and 96). From these facts, the jury could reasonably
infer that Exhibit 5 was the gold watch which defendant had taken
from the store and that it haa oeen damaged in the struggle
between defendant and the salesmen.
POINT II
JUDGE SAWAYA EXERCISED PROPER DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Utah courts have stated on many occasions, "[i]t is a
matter solely within the discretion of the trial court as to
whether it should grant a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence."

State v. Harris 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P.2d

438, 439 (Utah 1973).

The determination to deny a motion for a

new trial based on a newly discovered evidence claim "will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion."

State v.

Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); citing State v. Lesley,
672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).

Evaluation of the trial court's

discretion will only occur in "instances where there is a grave
suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because of the
lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the new evidence
will supply."

Harris, 513 P.2d at 439-440.

The material presented by defendant after trial does
not qualify as "new evidence," because it is not evidence that
could not with "reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at trial nor would they [the facts] be such as to render

a different result probable on retrial of the case."

Harris, 513

P.2d at 440. The new evidence alleged by defendant consists of a
supposedly eyewitness account that would contest the location of
the recovery of the two watches.

The defendant had ample time

between the time of the incident and the time of trial to find
witnesses in an attempt to establish his case.
The facts surrounding the discovery and allegations of
the witness who would testify to observing the arrest of
defendant provide adequate grounds for the trial judge to
determine that the "new evidence" would not have enlightened the
jury.

The Court was also correct in finding that this affidavit

did not provide evidence which would have negated evidence
presented at trial so as to not allow reasonable jurors to find
the defendant guilty as charged.

The new witness, found by the

defendant while the two men were incarcerated together, allegedly
would testify that "he had witnessed the watch—the two watches
being recovered from the street near the vehicle rather than . .
. one from his wrist and one from the floor of the carM (T. at
133).

In effect, this new testimony would run counter to the

testimony of the two police officers and the two salesmen.

It is

also conceivable that other witnesses could have been called by
the prosecution to support the testimony of the policemen and the
salesmen.

Other potential witnesses were the paramedics and the

pedestrians who helped apprehend defendant who could have been
called as witnesses to establish the location of the recovery of
the watches.

Had a new trial been granted, the "marvelous
coincidence" (T. at 134) of the appearance of this witness would
have strained the credulity of reasonable persons called as the
jury.

This new "witness" was in jail and possibly the

prosecution could have challenged his credibility by establishing
prior convictions for him.

The length of time between the

arrest, May 20, and the meeting of defendant and the "witness",
approximately September 20, supports a strong suspicion that this
observation of the arrest was a fabrication.

The trial court's

decision that this newly discovered evidence would not have
changed the verdict (T. at 134) was not an abuse of discretion.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL ESTABLISHED
THE VALUE OF THE TWO WATCHES TAKEN
SUFFICIENTLY TO SUPPORT A FELONY CONVICTION.
Defendant's final contention is that the value of the
watches did not support a third degree felony conviction.

This

is based on his argument that this Court should find that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the conviction of
theft for one or the other of the watches, if not both.

The

uncontroverted evidence is that the watches were stolen from a
retail establishment and that the retailer offered them for sale
at $220 and $180, at the very minimum.

Exhibit 1 was for sale at

$275 but the store owner testified that he would have allowed it
to be sold for $220, but no less.

Exhibit 5 was marked at $225

but could be sold for no less than $180 (T. at 89-90).

Clearly,

the two watches together were valued at $400 total, at a minimum.
Defendant's contention is that this Court should find

insufficient evidence exists to support theft of at least one of
the watches.

If this Court were to so find, then the value of

whichever watch remained would be less than $250; however, as
noted above in Point I, the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction of theft for both of the watches.
CONCLUSION
The defendant has failed to establish that the evidence
in this case is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable
minds could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and has also failed to establish grounds sufficient to grant a
new trial.

Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully

requests that this Court affirm the jury's verdict for
conviction, and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
for a new trial.
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Assistant Attorney General
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